AUKUS Eyes Japan for Expansion, Raising Questions About Canada's Role in Indo-Pacific Security

The geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific is poised for a significant shift as the AUKUS security alliance—comprising Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—is in advanced talks to welcome Japan as its first additional partner. The potential expansion, confirmed by officials from member nations, would focus on the pact's "Pillar II," which involves collaboration on advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, hypersonics, and cyber warfare. This move is widely seen as an effort to bolster a collective deterrent against China's increasing military and technological assertiveness, but it also casts a harsh spotlight on Canada's position on the sidelines of this critical alliance.

AUKUS was first announced in September 2021 with two primary objectives. Pillar I, the most prominent component, is a long-term project to provide Australia with a fleet of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. Pillar II is a broader, more immediate initiative designed to foster technology sharing and joint development among the allies to maintain a qualitative military edge. While Pillar I remains exclusive to the founding trio, Pillar II was designed with the potential for expansion to include trusted partners.

Japan has emerged as the leading candidate for this expansion. Its inclusion is strategically logical for the AUKUS members. Japan is a major technological powerhouse with significant investments in the very fields covered by Pillar II. Geographically, it is a frontline state in the Indo-Pacific, sharing key security concerns about China's actions in the East and South China Seas. As a steadfast U.S. ally with a newly invigorated defence posture, Japan’s participation would substantially enhance the alliance's capabilities and extend its strategic reach in the region.

A Broadening Coalition and Canada's Position

The move to expand AUKUS is part of a broader, coordinated effort by Western allies to address challenges posed by Beijing. This strategic alignment was also evident when the G7, including Canada, issued a stern warning to China over its economic practices and support for Russia's war effort. The AUKUS expansion represents the 'hard security' dimension of this strategy, complementing the economic and diplomatic pressure exerted by groups like the G7. Leaders have consistently signaled that they are prepared to take further action, as seen when the G7 warned China of 'further measures' if it did not change course. By bringing Japan into a formal technology-sharing pact, the allies are solidifying a coalition of technologically advanced democracies to counterbalance China's influence.

However, this consolidation of power among allies has left Canada in an awkward position. As a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance alongside the AUKUS nations, Canada's exclusion from the pact's formation was a notable diplomatic slight. At the time, analysts pointed to several factors, including Canada's relatively low defence spending—which has persistently fallen short of the 2% of GDP NATO guideline—and a perceived reluctance under the current government to take a more assertive stance on China. While Canada has since released its own Indo-Pacific Strategy, committing more resources and diplomatic focus to the region, it has not been enough to secure an invitation to the AUKUS table.

Implications for Canadian Defence and Technology

Japan's potential entry into AUKUS Pillar II intensifies the pressure on Ottawa. Being outside this framework means Canadian defence and technology sectors could miss out on lucrative and strategically vital collaborations. The pact is not just about military hardware; it is about creating integrated supply chains and research ecosystems for the technologies that will define the future of warfare and security. Canadian companies with expertise in AI, quantum computing, and aerospace, such as CAE Inc. and MDA Ltd., risk being siloed from their counterparts in allied nations.

The debate within Canada is now whether to actively lobby for inclusion or to pursue a different path. Proponents of joining argue that AUKUS is the most significant security development among Canada's traditional allies in decades and that remaining outside it risks long-term strategic irrelevance. They contend that Canada must significantly increase its defence budget and demonstrate a tangible commitment to Indo-Pacific security, including more frequent naval deployments and participation in joint military exercises.

Conversely, some critics question the high cost of entry and the pact's singular focus on confronting China, arguing that Canada should pursue a more independent foreign policy. They suggest that Canada could still collaborate with AUKUS nations on a case-by-case basis without formally joining the pact. However, as Pillar II solidifies its membership and projects, the opportunities for ad-hoc participation may dwindle.

As AUKUS prepares to formalize its first expansion, Canada finds itself at a strategic crossroads. The decision to bring Japan into the fold will not only reshape the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific but also force Canada to confront difficult questions about its own role in the world, its relationship with its closest allies, and its willingness to make the substantial investments required to secure a seat at the table.